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“United States government leadership is critical if we are to succeed in
eliminating the threat of drugs in sports.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a syringe was sent anonymously to the United States Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA) containing what was discovered to be tetrahydrogestrinone
(THG), a “designer” steroid that was engineered to be undetectable in standard
drug tests.2 The entity that allegedly manufactured and distributed THG, the
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), came under grand jury
investigation for violations of numerous federal laws.3 Information obtained as
part of the investigation contained the names of several elite amateur and
professional athletes who allegedly had used THG, including several Olympiccaliber track and field athletes.4 As the BALCO scandal unfolded and the
2004 Athens Olympic Games approached, USADA as well as many members
of Congress and the Executive Branch became concerned that these track and
field athletes might not be caught. Both USADA and the federal government
were determined to ensure that the United States sent a “clean” team to the
Athens Olympics.5 To that end, a Senate Committee subpoenaed Department
of Justice documents related to the BALCO investigation, which included the
names of the track and field athletes in question, and turned them over to
1. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic
Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 106th Cong. 23 (1999),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&
docid=f:75594.pdf [hereinafter Effects of Drugs Hearing] (statement of General Barry R.
McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
2. Richard McLaren, The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games, 15 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 175, 176 (2004). Olympic sprinter Marion Jones’s former coach Trevor Graham
later admitted being the anonymous sender. Lance Williams & Mark Fainaru-Wada, How a
Syringe Ushered in a Major Sports Scandal: Coach Acknowledged He Gave Evidence to
Investigators, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2004, at A15; see also Adrian Wilairat, Faster, Higher,
Stronger? Federal Efforts to Criminalize Anabolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 377, 385 (2005).
3. McLaren, supra note 2, at 176.
4. See id. at 176–77.
5. See Owen Slot, United States Risk Losing Race Against Time to Keep Athens Clean,
TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 2004, at 46; John Niyo, USOC Establishes Lofty Standards for
Olympics: But Barriers Could Hinder Expectation of 100 Medals, DETROIT NEWS, May 6, 2004,
at 1E.
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USADA.6 Relying on these documents, USADA pursued and ultimately
secured sanctions against several athletes7 for what it deemed to be “nonanalytical positives,”8 that is, where the athlete did not fail a drug test but
where there was some evidence of an attempt to cheat.9
USADA’s aggressive pursuit of athletes allegedly involved in the BALCO
scandal, and the federal government’s involvement in these efforts, sparked
enormous controversy.10 Critics of USADA’s actions asserted that USADA
was not respecting athletes’ constitutional due process rights, and at least one
athlete, Marion Jones, threatened to sue USADA if it sanctioned her based on a
“non-analytical positive.”11 As stated at the time by one sports commentator,
“You get an uneasy feeling from watching [USADA] . . . . You get the feeling
they’d waive the U.S. Constitution if they could—which is a pretty unsettling
thing to feel about an organization that is funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars and a
grant from the White House.”12 USADA, on the other hand, has suggested that
it is a private, non-governmental organization that is not bound by the
constraints of the Constitution.13 Amid such controversy, it is not at all clear
what USADA’s legal status is for constitutional purposes.14
This Article examines USADA and its relationship to the federal
government to determine whether USADA’s actions could be constrained by
the Constitution. While it is clear that USADA has very close ties to the
federal government, this Article argues that it is not a government entity, and
in most cases is not engaged in state action. Accordingly, in the typical doping
case, constitutional restrictions would not apply to USADA’s conduct. In
unique circumstances when the federal government does intervene, however,

6. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., and Trans., Comm. to Subpoena
DOJ Documents Relating to Banned Substance Use in Olympics (April 8, 2004),
http://commerce.senate.gov/newsroom/printable.cfm?id=220726.
7. Beau Dure, BALCO Investigation: Key Players, USATODAY.COM, Dec. 13, 2005,
www.usatoday.com/sports/balco-players.htm.
8. 2004 USADA ANN. REP. 1, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/
annual_report_2004.pdf.
9. McLaren, supra note 2, at 177.
10. See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court
of Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1203–04 (2005).
11. Joel Stein, Chasing the Truth: Track Stars Marion Jones and Her Boyfriend Tim
Montgomery are Entangled in Steroids Investigations, TIME, June 7, 2004, at 52, 52.
12. Sally Jenkins, Due Process? Not for Track Stars, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at D1.
13. See Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA
Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 124–25 (2003).
14. Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 561 (2002) (“Questions remain, however, over the
legal and practical status of USADA . . . .”).
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as it did in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, there is
a strong case that USADA’s conduct amounts to state action.
II. BACKGROUND—WHY AND HOW USADA WAS CREATED
A.

The Federal Government’s Interest in Drugs and Sports

In examining whether USADA is a government entity or whether, as a
private entity, its actions might be attributable to the government, it is
necessary to consider the “nature and history” of USADA and the importance
of fighting drug use in sports to the United States Government.15 Moreover, it
is helpful to understand the significance to USADA of avoiding constitutional
restrictions.
1.

The Federal Government and the USOC

Understanding the history of USADA necessarily requires a brief overview
of the federal government’s relationship with the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC), from which USADA was created. The United States,
unlike many other countries, does not have an official government agency or
ministry for sports. This is because, as one commentator has explained, “[t]he
issue of sports governance does not fit neatly into the U.S. Government
structure.”16 This does not mean, however, that sports issues are not important
to the United States Government. It is in this tension between the structure of
our government, which tends to leave sports issues to the private sector, and
our government’s interest in sports, where the USOC, and now USADA,
operate.
The USOC, as it exists today, was developed as a result of the Commission
on Olympic Sports created by President Ford in 1975 to study ways in which
the United States could be more successful in Olympic competition.17 The
Commission called on Congress to restructure the USOC so that it would
function as an institution to centrally coordinate the United States’ amateur
athletic development.18 This led to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978,19 which
15. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 383 (1995) (“Before
proceeding to consider Lebron’s contention that Amtrak, though nominally a private corporation,
must be regarded as a Government entity . . . we examine the nature and history of
Amtrak . . . .”); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
291–95 (2001) (reviewing the history and structure of the TSSAA before analyzing whether its
actions were “fairly attributable” to the state).
16. Panel II: Regulations Governing Drugs and Performance Enhancers in Sports, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 340 (2002) [hereinafter Panel II: Regulations
Governing Drugs] (statement of Edward Jurith, General Counsel, Office of National Drug
Control Policy).
17. Exec. Order No. 11,868, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1975).
18. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554 (1987).
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made the USOC a federally-chartered corporation. The Act gave the USOC
the exclusive power to coordinate and govern Olympic Movement athletics in
the United States.20
Both through formal means, such as providing funding and through the
oversight requirements of the Amateur Sports Act, and by more informal
means, the federal government exercises significant influence over the USOC.
For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prior to the 1980
Moscow Olympic Games, President Carter and Congress called on the USOC
to boycott the Games.21 The President, however, made clear that he would
take all steps necessary to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow.22
Not surprisingly, the USOC voted not to send a team to the Games.23 More
recently, Congress has taken an interest in reforming the USOC in response to
allegations of mismanagement and ethical violations. To this end, in 2003,
committees in both the House and Senate held several hearings on USOC
reform, and a group of Senators created an independent commission to
recommend changes to the USOC’s structure. During one such hearing, Bill
Martin, acting president of the USOC, told Congress: “All of this comes down
to the question of just what Congress, to whom we are ultimately accountable,
wants the USOC to do. Unfortunately, it seems that individual Members have
differing views on what our mission should be . . . .”24 Martin further stated
that “[w]e need Congress’ help in developing and implementing an
organizational restructuring plan . . . .”25 Thus, although the USOC operates in
many ways as a private corporation, it is nevertheless subject to considerable
government oversight and influence. As will be explained below, the federal
government’s influence over the USOC allowed Congress and the Office of

19. Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–
220529 (2000)).
20. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 554.
21. See H.R. Con. Res. 249, 96th Cong. (1980); Alan Abrahamson, Pointless to Some: Time
Hasn’t Healed Everything for the 1980 U.S. Olympians Who Didn’t Have a Chance to Compete,
L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at D1.
22. Barry Lorge, President Threatens to Bar U.S. Athletes, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1980, at
A1.
23. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d,
701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declining to enjoin the USOC from carrying out its resolution of
April 12, 1980, not to send a team to Moscow).
24. Does the U.S. Olympic Committee’s Organizational Structure Impede its Mission?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 26 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.52&filename=86055.pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/
108_house_hearings [hereinafter USOC Organizational Structure Hearing] (statement of William
C. Martin, Acting President, USOC).
25. Id. at 27.
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National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to take the lead role in establishing
USADA.
2.

The Fight Against Performance-Enhancing Drug Use in Amateur
Sports

In addition to the federal government’s considerable interest in the USOC,
both Congress and the Executive Branch also have had an interest in
performance-enhancing drug use in sports. For instance, in 1989, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held hearings on “the steroid abuse problem in America”
following the 1988 Olympic gold medal performance of Canadian sprinter Ben
Johnson, who was later stripped of his medal after it was discovered that he
had used steroids.26 At that hearing, it was stressed that steroid use by elite
athletes undermines important Olympic ideals and has a substantial negative
effect on young people.27 Similar concerns were voiced by the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary during
its hearing on steroid-related legislation,28 involving the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act of 1990,29 which amended the Controlled Substances Act30 in an
attempt to further restrict the use of anabolic steroids.31
Government concern over performance-enhancing drug use in sports
continued, and in the late 1990s ONDCP and Congress made fighting drug use
in sports a top priority. The issue gained greater prominence at this time
because of persistent reports of performance-enhancing drug use by elite
athletes and the fact that such use, in the view of many, was leading to an
increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs, including steroids, by
young people. As stated by Senator Ron Wyden in a 1999 hearing on doping
in sports, “[W]e are seeing a public health crisis with respect to these drugs in
American youths. It seems that now the same number of kids using some kind
of steroid, is the number that are using cocaine.”32 General Barry McCaffrey,
26. See Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports—The Medical and Social Costs of
Steroid Abuse: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 101 (1989)
[hereinafter Abuse of Steroids Hearings] (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden). The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary noted that the Steroid Trafficking Act was necessary because “illegal
steroids trafficking remains a major drug problem in the United States.” S. REP. NO. 101-433, at
2 (1990).
27. Id.
28. Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 10 (1990) [hereinafter Anabolic Steroids Control Act Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Mel Levine).
29. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4851. The legislation supplemented the provisions of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which made the illegal sale of steroids a felony. See Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2000).
31. See Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 § 1902.
32. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden).
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former head of ONDCP, underscored this point, stating at the same hearing
that there was wide-spread use of steroids among young adolescents. He noted
that about 550,000 young people used steroids in 1995, with the number
expected to grow.33 Moreover, it was not just steroid use by Olympic
Movement athletes that concerned the government, but use of such drugs by
professional athletes as well.34 Accordingly, many members of Congress and
particularly the ONDCP became very interested in fighting doping in sports.35
The fight against doping in sports also became more urgent because of the
growing international perception that the United States was not doing enough
to fight the use of performance-enhancing drugs by its Olympic athletes.36 As
stated by Dr. Johann Olav Koss, the Athlete Representative to the IOC and the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA):
The perception internally is bad about the USA, and about what the USOC or
other national governing bodies have done to protect their athletes in
participating and helping them cheat . . . . This is the perception . . . . There is
no way you ask anyone outside the United States to believe that American
athletes have not been cheating in the past.37

33. Id. at 9 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
34. See Abuse of Steroids Hearings, supra note 26, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
35. This interest continues today. Indeed, the issue of drugs in sports even gained the
attention of President Bush, who mentioned the issue in his 2004 State of the Union Address. He
stated that
[t]he use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other
sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message, that there are shortcuts to
accomplishment and that performance is more important than character. So tonight I call
on team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the lead, to send the
right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.
Pres. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 94, 100 (Jan.
20, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_
presidential_documents&docid=pd26ja04_txt-10.pdf. More recently, Congress passed and
President Bush signed the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 Stat.
1661 (2004). The Act added certain anabolic steroid precursors to the list of controlled
substances, required a review of the Federal sentencing guidelines for offenses involving anabolic
steroids, and established a grant program in support of anabolic steroid education. Id. Moreover,
as stated recently by Congressman Henry Waxman, “There is an absolute correlation between the
culture of steroids in the major league clubhouse and the culture of steroids in high school gyms.
If we can remove steroids from the clubhouse, we will fix the problems in school locker rooms.”
Press Release, John McCain, McCain, Davis, and Waxman Announce Introduction of “Clean
Sports Act of 2005” (May 24, 2005), http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1579; see also Sarah Baldwin, Note and Comment,
Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Olympic Sport: A Comparison of the United States and
Australian Approaches, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 275 (2002).
36. Tygart, supra note 13, at 124.
37. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST MEETING
OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 36 (Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter
WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE] (statement of Dr. Johann Olav Koss).
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This perception was fueled by the structure of the United States’ prior antidoping program, the National Anti-Doping Program (NADP). The NADP
administered drug testing through the USOC, but relied on each sport’s
National Governing Body (NGB) to prosecute athletes for doping violations
under the NGB’s own administrative procedures.38 As a result, the entities that
were charged with selecting the finest athletes for Olympic and international
competition, the USOC and NGBs, also administered drug testing and meted
out the sanctions. Critics argued that the USOC and NGBs therefore had an
inherent conflict of interest that prevented them from administering drug tests
and punishing dopers effectively.39
The need to bolster the credibility of United States’ anti-doping efforts,
combined with the perceived public health effects of doping by elite athletes,
spurred Congress and ONDCP to press for immediate change to the way antidoping was approached in the United States. These concerns were even more
urgent because the United States, as host for the Salt Lake City Olympic
Games in 2002, wanted to ensure that it sponsored a “clean” Olympic
Games.40
3.

The National Anti-Doping Strategy

Serious government efforts to address doping in sports came together in
1999, when ONDCP announced its “National Strategy” to combat drug use
and doping in sports.41 ONDCP began working on the issue of doping in
sports after the 1998 Nagano Olympic Games, where, in the words of ONDCP
Director Barry McCaffrey, “an athlete who tested positive for marijuana was
awarded the Olympic gold and hoisted up on the medal platform as a hero to
all the world’s youth.”42 The National Strategy, which was in development for
over a year,43 was premised on the belief that “the United States government
[had] a responsibility to undertake efforts at the national, binational and
international levels to strengthen anti-doping regimes.”44 The National
Strategy was meant to explain the federal efforts to combat doping in sport,45
and it was developed by an inter-agency working group in consultation with
various “stakeholders,” including athletes and the USOC.46 The so-called
Federal Team that worked on the strategy included the Secretary of the
38. Tygart, supra note 13, at 126.
39. Id. at 126–27; see also Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (statement of Barry
McCaffrey).
40. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
41. Id. at 13, 18–23.
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 20.
45. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20–21.
46. Id. at 18–20.
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Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as other HHS
officials, and officials from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of
State, and the White House.47 Although the Government had clear objectives
in mind when the National Strategy was announced, McCaffrey noted that
ONDCP had to respect the view that the federal government should not
intervene in amateur sports issues.48 The goal was for the National Strategy to
significantly change the United States’ approach to doping prior to the 2000
Sydney Summer Olympic games.49
In announcing the National Strategy, ONDCP asserted that drug use and
doping in sport had become an “international crisis.”50 ONDCP noted that at
the Olympic level, doping had grown to a point where it was hurting honest
athletes who could not successfully compete against those who used
performance-enhancing drugs.51 In addition, those who were successful had
their victories questioned.52 Beyond the effects at the Olympic level, ONDCP
stressed that doping had an impact on children, as the use of performanceenhancing drugs by children continued to grow.53 The use of such drugs was
of particular concern because performance-enhancing drugs like steroids were
believed to have serious health consequences, and ONDCP noted that doping
in sports was “perceived” to be a major public health crisis.54 Additionally,
ONDCP asserted that trafficking in performance-enhancing drugs was a
burgeoning criminal industry.55
Because there were significant and
widespread effects of doping, it advocated for “a new approach” to address the
problem.56
ONDCP specifically listed several areas that needed to be addressed. First,
ONDCP stated that because professional sports did not ban a number of
performance-enhancing drugs that were banned in international competition,
there were international concerns over the United States’ commitment to antidoping.57 In addition, ONDCP stated that the USOC’s anti-doping program
was insufficient because of the inherent conflicts of interest and a failure to
effectively administer no-notice, out-of-competition testing.58 While ONDCP
noted that these issues were the basis for international criticism, it was also of

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
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major concern to Olympic sponsors and the American public, who, according
to ONDCP, were viewing the Olympics as “yet another fraud on the public.”59
ONDCP’s Strategy sought to address these concerns with several specific
proposals. Most significantly, on the national level, ONDCP asserted that an
effective anti-doping program might require federal oversight and reporting
such that there would be appropriate federal review and certification.60
Moreover, through the National Strategy, ONDCP contemplated working with
the USOC and others to “facilitate the development of an externalized and
fully independent domestic anti-doping mechanism or body (including
research, testing, and adjudication).”61 The strategy thus envisioned an
effective and accountable “U.S. agency” with “certain governmental or quasigovernmental powers.”62 ONDCP asserted that governmental status would
improve the accountability of anti-doping efforts and significantly enhance the
United States’ credibility.63 ONDCP stated that while it was not advocating
the creation of additional “bureaucracy,” it did hope to work with Congress on
developing the proposed anti-doping institution.64 ONDCP’s strategy also
advocated for more federal support for advanced research into doping to
develop better drug tests.65
The ONDCP Strategy also involved significant international efforts to
develop an “independent and accountable international anti-doping agency”
that engages in year-round no-notice testing of athletes.66 ONDCP asserted
that this agency should work to deter doping by having no statute of limitations
on doping offenses (so that athletes could lose their titles at any time if
evidence becomes available that they cheated), a policy of preserving samples
for at least ten years so they could be tested if and when new drug tests become
available, and an aggressive research agenda to remain one step ahead of
cheaters.67
ONDCP stated that as a follow up to its announcement of the National
Strategy, it would form a task force chaired by ONDCP and other executive
branch officials, and in cooperation with Congress, move forward on the
proposed reforms.68 To that end, Executive Order 13,165 established the
White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports, which included the Director
of ONDCP, the Secretary of HHS, the Olympic Task Force Vice Chairs, and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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representatives appointed by the Department of Labor, the President’s Council
on Physical Fitness and Sports, the Office of Management and Budget, the
National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Transportation, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.69 The purpose
of the Task Force was to “develop recommendations for the President on
further executive and legislative actions that can be undertaken to address the
problem of doping and drug use in sports.”70 The Task Force was convened in
December, 2000, after the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) and USADA.71 The Task Force discussed further challenges in the
fight against doping, with one of the key conclusions being that USADA, to be
effective, needed “some instrumentality of the United States status.”72 As
stated by Barry McCaffrey, “We are going to have to make sure we do have an
agency that can act as a representative of the U.S. Government.”73
B.

The Government’s Efforts to Establish Domestic and International AntiDoping Agencies

As noted above, key components of ONDCP’s National Strategy were the
establishment of both an international anti-doping agency independent of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the establishment of a domestic
anti-doping agency that was independent of the USOC.74 It was contemplated
that these entities would work in a coordinated way and that the United States
government would have influence with both.75
1.

The Creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency

To be sure, the effort to establish WADA was a multi-national one,
including the governments of Australia, Great Britain, France, and Germany,
among others.76 The United States government, however, as part of the
National Strategy, played a significant role in the effort.77

69. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F.R. 288 (2001), reprinted in 21 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
70. 3 C.F.R. 288, § 2(b).
71. See Christopher Smith, 2002 Backdrop for Anti-drug Message, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec.
6, 2000, at A6.
72. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 83 (closing remarks by Barry McCaffrey).
73. Id. at 83–84.
74. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
75. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (statement by Barry McCaffrey).
76. See id. at 22.
77. See Panel II: Regulations Governing Drugs, supra note 16, at 340 (statement of Edward
Jurith: “At ONDCP, we led an initiative in the last Administration working with other nations and
the International Olympic Committee . . . to create the World Anti-Doping Agency . . . .”).
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In the late 1990s, the United States was leading a movement to effectuate
change within the IOC, which was viewed by many United States government
officials as corrupt.78 The United States had long wanted an Olympic
Movement drug testing entity that was independent of the IOC;79 however, at
least some members of the government believed that progress in the fight
against doping could not be made until larger questions of IOC reform were
resolved.80 The United States Government stepped up its efforts in this regard
in February 1999, when a delegation of government officials and others within
the United States Olympic Movement, led by ONDCP Director Barry
McCaffrey, went to Lausanne, Switzerland, for the World Conference on
Doping in Sport.81 Out of this conference came the Lausanne Declaration,
which called for an independent International Anti-Doping Agency to be
established before the Sydney Games in 2000.82 There were significant
concerns, however, that what the IOC was proposing for such an entity was, as
Barry McCaffrey reported to the Senate Committee, “more public relations
ploy than public policy solution” and that the proposal did not meet the United
States’ requirements.83 Among the United States’ concerns were that the
proposed agency was not truly independent from the IOC, was not transparent,
and that it failed to give governments who would substantially fund the
agency, including the United States, an adequate role in the agency’s
McCaffrey told the Senate
leadership and policy-making process.84
Committee that ONDCP had started to develop an “international consensus
approach” to pressure the IOC into making changes to the proposal.85
McCaffrey stated that he planned to lead a team of Executive Branch officials
to Europe in order to work with United States allies and international
organizations, such as the U.N. Drug Control Programme and the Council of
Europe, in an effort to build consensus to force the IOC to change its proposal
for an independent anti-doping agency that met the United States’ goals.86
Moreover, McCaffrey told the Senate Committee that if the IOC was not
responsive to ONDCP’s reform efforts, then “we will need your support to
force change. In short, your leadership and that of the Committee will be

78. See, e.g., Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 27 (statement of Sen. Wyden: “I
think that there is an extraordinary record of foot-dragging with respect to the International
Committee. . . . They have always found a way to duck out of the specifics . . . which are
essentially transparency and accountability.”).
79. See id. at 11 (opening statement of Chairman, Sen. John McCain).
80. Id. at 28 (testimony of Barry McCaffrey).
81. Id. at 48 (statement of Frank Shorter, U.S. Olympic Gold Medalist).
82. Id. at 63–64 (statement of Richard Pound, First Vice President of the IOC).
83. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 22.
86. Id.
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critical to the creation of a truly independent agency and a fully effective
international anti-doping regime.”87 McCaffrey led another delegation to a
Summit of Governments in Australia later that year once again to address the
problem of doping in Olympic sports.88 In addition, Senator Ted Stevens
previously had traveled to Switzerland to meet with the head of the IOC, Juan
Antonio Samaranch, regarding the issue of doping.89 Henry Kissinger worked
with the ONDCP, as well, to effectuate change generally within the IOC.90
WADA was ultimately established and began operations on November 10,
1999.91 Its mission is to “combine[] the resources of sports and governments
to enhance, supplement, and coordinate existing efforts to educate athletes
about the harms of doping, reinforce the ideal of fair play, and sanction those
who cheat themselves and their sport.”92 WADA receives its funding from the
IOC and world governments.93 In August 2000, President Clinton, through
Executive Order 13,165, facilitated the United States government’s role in
WADA.94 The Executive Order stated that the Administration was adopting a
policy “to take the steps needed to help eliminate illicit or otherwise banned
drug use and doping in sports at the State, national, and international level.”95
The Executive Order stated that as part of these efforts, “the United States has
played a leading role in the formation of a World Anti-Doping Agency . . . .”96
The Executive Order authorized the Director of ONDCP “to serve as the
United States Government’s representative on the WADA board.”97 It also
authorized federal employees, acting in their “official capacit[ies],” to serve on
WADA committees or advisory committees and serve as experts to the
organization.98
The United States has a significant leadership role in WADA. For
instance, the United States sits on WADA’s Foundation Board.99 The

87. Id.
88. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 8.
89. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Stevens).
90. Id. at 19 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
91. World Anti-Doping Agency History, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=253 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
92. World Anti-Doping Agency Mission, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=255 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
93. World Anti-Doping Agency Finance, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=259 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (stating that the first two years of WADA’s existence
were funded by the Olympic Movement, and since 2002 “equally from the Olympic movement
and the governments of the world”).
94. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F.R. 288 (2001), reprinted in 21 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
95. 3 C.F.R. 288, § 1.
96. Id. § 3(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 3(c).
99. Id. § 3(a).
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Foundation Board is WADA’s “supreme decision making body,”100 and it has
the authority to supervise the activities of WADA, as well as to designate the
individuals who will serve on the Executive Committee, which handles the
day-to-day operations of WADA.101 In addition, the United States is one of the
five nations represented on WADA’s Executive Committee, and it recently
chaired WADA’s Ethics and Education Committee.102 The United States,
along with many other governments, pays dues to WADA pursuant to a
previously agreed-upon formula.103 These dues are paid through ONDCP.104
Stated ONDCP Director Barry McCaffrey: “That we created a World AntiDoping Agency in short order is astonishing. From its origins as a housetethered goat of the IOC, it’s become an institution that in the coming several
years . . . will serve our purposes well.”105
In addition to its efforts to establish WADA, the United States Government
“played a leadership role” in drafting the World Anti-Doping Code
(WADC),106 which was adopted on March 5, 2003.107 The Code has been
adopted by all major international sports federations and more than one
hundred countries.108 The Code is administered by WADA109 and is what
USADA follows in testing and sanctioning United States athletes.110 The
United States, along with other governments, agreed to continue funding
100. World Anti-Doping Agency Composition: Introduction, http://www.wadaama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=258 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
101. Id.; see also Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 75 (Draft Mission Statement and
Constating Document for World Anti-Doping Agency, Art. 11).
102. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to
Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 140 (2005),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&
filename=20323.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_house_hearings [hereinafter Restoring
Faith in America’s Pastime] (statement of Dr. Gary Wadler).
103. See Memorandum of Understanding, Executive Office of the President Office of
National Drug Control Policy–World Anti-Doping Agency, FY 2004.
104. Id. Most recently, in its FY 2005 budget request, ONDCP asked for $1 million for
WADA membership dues. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2005
BUDGET SUMMARY 90 (2004), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf.
105. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 10 (keynote remarks of Barry
McCaffrey).
106. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 102, at 136 (testimony of Dr. Gary
Wadler).
107. John T. Wendt, WADA, Doping and THG, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 28.
108. Id. at 28.
109. World Anti-Doping Agency Mission, supra note 92.
110. UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2005 GUIDE TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES AND
PROHIBITED METHODS OF DOPING 1 (Larry D. Bowers et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/what/usada_guide.pdf [hereinafter 2005 USADA GUIDE
TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES]; see Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 102, at 136
(testimony of Dr. Gary Wadler).
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WADA as part of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport,
which will be presented to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s General Conference in the near future.111
2.

The Government’s Role in Creating USADA

While the United States Government worked on the international level to
create WADA, it also was laying the foundation at home for the establishment
of USADA. USADA states that it was formed as a result of the
recommendations of the USOC Select Task Force on Drug Externalization
(USOC Task Force).112 However, this explanation does not account fully for
the important role ONDCP and Congress played in USADA’s creation.
Specifically, much of the impetus for and effort to create USADA was from
ONDCP, with strong Congressional backing, long before the USOC Task
Force had even convened.
As noted above, the notion of an anti-doping entity independent of the
USOC was a featured part of ONDCP’s National Strategy and had strong
Congressional approval.113 During the October 1999 hearing in which the
National Strategy was presented, Senator John McCain stated that the “gross
shortcomings” of the USOC’s anti-doping program had been exposed, and
a consensus on the necessary elements of an approach to curbing the use of
performance enhancing drugs exists.
The first step is the establishment of an independent or external agency to
perform year-round, out-of-competition testing for banned substances. . . .
Testing must be universal in that all athletes wishing to compete in the
Olympic games should be required to submit to the testing regime established
by this independent agency. . . .
Finally, a comprehensive and sustained anti-drug and sports ethics education
program should be developed and implemented.114

This point was echoed by ONDCP. In announcing the National Strategy,
ONDCP Director Barry McCaffrey stated that “[w]orking with the USOC and
other stakeholders to facilitate the development of an externalized and fully
independent domestic anti-doping mechanism or body” was “[a]mong the key
initiatives at the national level.”115
111. World Anti-Doping Agency Finance, supra note 93; see also UNESCO General
Conference, International Convention Against Doping in Sport, Sept. 6, 2005,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140597e.pdf (Final Draft).
112. 2001 USADA ANN. REP. 2, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/
annual_report_2001.pdf.
113. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
114. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 1–2 (opening statement of Sen. John McCain).
115. Id. at 20 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
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Both ONDCP and Congress had direct influence on how USADA would
be structured and what its mission would be. While briefing Congress on the
National Strategy, McCaffrey commented on the USOC Task Force’s work,
stating that the USOC’s early proposals were “pretty good work. . . . I do not
think it is at the end of its developmental cycle, but the U.S. Olympic
Committee has gone for the notion of drug testing externalization.”116 At that
same hearing, Bill Hybl, then-president of the USOC, reported to the
Committee on the progress of the USOC Task Force and its recommendations
to date.117 The Committee also heard testimony from athletes and other
experts on the USOC Task Force’s proposals and solicited their views on how
a new anti-doping program should be structured.118 Indeed, in addition to the
broad outlines of an anti-doping entity, Congress was concerned with details
such as for how long, and where, athletes’ urine specimens should be kept and
stored.119 Both ONDCP and Congress wanted to see an anti-doping agency
established before the 2000 Sydney Olympics.120
The work of the government, and particularly ONDCP, in creating
USADA was underscored by USADA’s first chair, Frank Shorter. In his
presentation as part of the White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports in
December, 2000, Mr. Shorter explained:
[The formation of USADA] really was through the efforts of Barry McCaffrey
and the White House in the United States, as the result of having gone to the
drug summit in Lausanne eighteen months ago and determining that there
needed to be a totally independent drug testing agency in the United States for
all Olympic sports . . . .121

Mr. Shorter noted that he became involved in the effort because of his previous
work with Barry McCaffrey, including attending as part of ONDCP’s
delegation the Lausanne Summit.122 Significantly, Mr. Shorter highlighted
ONDCP’s role in influencing the USOC and establishing USADA by stating
that “through [ONDCP’s] Rob Housman’s work behind the scenes, the
elements of this new agency that we discussed and formulated in Lausanne
eighteen months ago, happened to show up in the task force report of the U.S.
Olympic Committee in the creati[on] of this agency.”123
116. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 52–56 (statement of Bill Hybl).
118. E.g., id. at 108–12 (memorandum of Doriane Lambelet Coleman).
119. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 25 (questioning by Sen. Ted Stevens
directed to Barry McCaffrey).
120. Id. at 12 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
121. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 15 (statement of Frank Shorter, USADA
chair).
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added). More recently, in reflecting on USADA’s formation, Jim Scherr
testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on the “joint
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Therefore, because of the federal government’s ability to influence the
USOC, and ONDCP’s behind-the-scenes efforts, it is not at all surprising that
the USOC Task Force, in December 1999, ultimately recommended that “an
Independent Organization be created to conduct a comprehensive anti-doping
program in the United States.”124 Consistent with ONDCP’s National
Strategy, and the wishes of members of Congress such as Senator McCain, this
entity was to have responsibility for drug testing all athletes participating in the
Olympic Movement,125 and the entity was to conduct research and educate the
public on the effects of doping.126 In addition, initial funding for USADA was
to come from the USOC and the federal government, but the expectation was
that for USADA to fulfill the mission outlined for it by ONDCP and the Senate
Committee, continued funding would have to come from the federal
government.127 Therefore, it is apparent that, in reality, USADA was not
simply created as a result of the USOC’s Task Force, but was in fact created
according to the specific goals laid out by ONDCP.128 In the words of Barry
McCaffrey, the USOC was really just one of the many “stakeholders” with
whom ONDCP worked in creating the National Strategy, which featured an
official testing agency independent from the USOC.129

effort” between the USOC and Congress to address doping in sports, stating that “[w]e think that
the fruit of this partnership—USADA—has more than fulfilled our early expectations when we
first discussed the concept nearly six years ago, and believe that with increased federal support it
will become an even more effective weapon to be used to eradicate this growing national
problem.” U.S. Anti-Doping Agency: Hearing on S. 529 Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and
Transp.,
109th
Cong.
(2005),
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id
=1511&wit_id=4275 [hereinafter S. 529 Hearing] (testimony of Jim Scherr, May 24, 2005).
124. REPORT OF THE USOC SELECT TASK FORCE ON DRUG EXTERNALIZATION (Dec. 3,
1999), http://www.runfrankshorter.com/usada.shtml [hereinafter REPORT ON DRUG
EXTERNALIZATION].
125. Tygart, supra note 13, at 125.
126. REPORT ON DRUG EXTERNALIZATION, supra note 124.
127. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Jim Scherr).
128. See Press Release, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Addendum to Statement of John
P. Walters Dir. of Nat’l Drug Control Policy Before the House Comm. On Appropriations,
Subcomm. On Transp., Treasury and Related Agencies: The Office of Nat’l Drug Control
Policy’s FY 2004 Budget Request (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/
testimony03/040903/add4.html [hereinafter ONDCP 2004 Budget Request]. Indeed, ONDCP has
since characterized the creation of USADA as a natural extension of the federal government’s
efforts to combat doping in sports. See id. To support its FY 2004 funding request for USADA,
found under the heading of “Other Federal Drug Control Programs,” ONDCP stated that doping
and drug use in sports was a growing national problem and that American athletes “at all
competition levels” are “jeopardizing their health and undermining the core values of sport” by
using performance-enhancing drugs. Id. ONDCP’s request then stated that “[a]s a result,
USADA was established to lead a comprehensive anti-doping program in the U.S.”
129. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
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From these substantial government efforts, USADA was established and
began operations on October 1, 2000.130 USADA was created as a private,
not-for-profit agency that undertakes its duties pursuant to a contract with the
USOC to administer the United States’ drug testing programs.131 USADA’s
mission is to preserve “the well-being of Olympic sport, the integrity of
competition, and ensuring the health of athletes.”132 To that end, USADA
focuses on the four areas outlined by ONDCP and the Senate Committee:
USADA is
education, research, testing, and results management.133
responsible for testing “any athlete who is a member of a NGB.”134 In
addition, USADA can test “any athlete participating at a competition
sanctioned by the USOC or a NGB,” or “any athlete who has been named by
the USOC or [a] NGB [to an Olympic or Pan American team or who] is
competing in a qualifying event to represent the USOC or [a] NGB in
international competition.”135 Indeed it has been stated that USADA’s
authority is broad enough to ensure that it combats all athletic doping within
the United States Olympic Movement.136 USADA is designated by Congress
as the United States’ official anti-doping agency.137
USADA is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors.138 The Board
consists of a diverse group of individuals from the medical and sports world.139
The Board has the authority to elect its own members.140 None of the
individuals on the Board of Directors is directly affiliated with the United
States government, although it was contemplated initially that the ONDCP
director would be able to submit nominations for the board.141 Currently,
Congress is proposing legislation that would involve ONDCP in drug testing
programs for professional sports leagues and the NCAA.142

130. USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2005).
131. Tygart, supra note 13, at 127.
132. 2004 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 8, at 3.
133. Id.
134. Tygart, supra note 13, at 128.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 129.
137. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555 (“The Congress of
the United States recognizes the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) as the official
anti-doping agency for Olympic, Pan American, and Paralympic sport in the United States.”).
138. USADA Board of Directors, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/meet/board.aspx (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005).
139. See id.
140. USADA History, supra note 130.
141. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 103 (Bill Hybl’s response to Sen. John
McCain’s written questions).
142. See Press Release, John McCain, supra note 35.
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C. Why USADA’s Designation as a Private Entity is Important
The Supreme Court has explained that, with respect to constitutional due
process protections, “this Court in the Civil Rights Cases affirmed the essential
dichotomy . . . between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its
provisions, and private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against
which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.”143 The importance to
USADA of operating as a private entity, in a climate free of constitutional
restrictions, is therefore clear. If USADA is simply a private entity, an athlete
charged with a doping violation would be entitled to no more due process than
what USADA144 and the Amateur Sports Act145 provide.146 If, however,
USADA were a state actor, an athlete so accused would be entitled to
constitutional due process protections.147
Even before USADA was created, there were concerns that the United
States would not be able to establish an effective anti-doping agency because
of constitutional rights of privacy and due process.148 After USADA was
created, at least some within ONDCP believed that the due process protections
offered by the Amateur Sports Act to an athlete should be changed so that an
athlete suspected of doping could be removed immediately from competition
before a hearing took place.149 Indeed, although acknowledging his views
were “politically incorrect,” Mickey Ibarra, Assistant to President Bill Clinton

143. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citations omitted); see also
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 884 F.2d 524, 530 (1989) (“It is axiomatic that the fifth
amendment applies to and restricts ‘only the Federal Government and not private persons.’”)
(citation omitted); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (holding that with regard to
private conduct, the Constitution does not allow for due process protections, “no matter how
unfair that conduct may be”).
144. For an explanation of USADA’s notice and appeal procedures for athletes who test
positive, see Tygart, supra note 13, at 135–38.
145. Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–
220529 (2000)) (giving an athlete the right to notice and a hearing in actions of their NGBs,
among other things).
146. A thorough analysis of whether an athlete would have a property interest in his or her
athletic career sufficient to trigger due process protections is outside the scope of this Paper. For
purposes of the state action analysis discussed here, it is assumed that a credible argument could
be made in this regard.
147. The protections provided to accused athletes through USADA and under the Amateur
Sports Act and those required by the Constitution, if USADA were found to be a state actor,
might not differ in the final analysis. However, the potential litigation that would arise if the
Constitution were applied to USADA’s actions could significantly hamper the agency’s antidoping efforts.
148. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 7 (keynote remarks of Barry
McCaffrey).
149. Id. at 35 (statement of Mickey Ibarra, Dir. of White House Intergovernmental Affairs)
(“[R]emoving an athlete from competition at that point [after positive test results but before a
hearing] helps level the playing.”).
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and Director of White House Intergovernmental Affairs, stated to the White
House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports that the Amateur Sports Act, because
of the due process protections, “ultimately undermines the overall effort that
we have here. . . . If at some point [an athlete who tested positive is] put back
because they win the adjudication, fine. . . . But let’s get that athlete off the
playing field . . . .”150 The former president of the USOC, Scott Blackmun,
echoed these concerns, asserting that an athlete is not prohibited from
competing without being first given a hearing because “the United States is a
country with fundamental notions of due process.”151 Blackmun went on to
state that the question is: “[S]hould those fundamental notions of due process
really have application in sport and in doping?”152
Due process challenges to anti-doping efforts are not new,153 and could be
raised to challenge USADA’s actions in several areas.154 First, USADA
applies a strict liability standard so that an athlete is responsible for any
substance present in his or her body that is on the banned substance list even if
the athlete did not intend to ingest the substance and has no knowledge of how
it got there.155 Thus, to sanction an athlete, USADA need not show that the
athlete intended to cheat.156 This feature is considered central to efforts to
combat doping.157 In addition, due process challenges have been premised on
whether the substance in question actually was performance enhancing.158 Due
process challenges have also been made based on the doping standards
themselves, and whether they provide credible evidence of a doping
violation.159 Finally, in addition to challenging the procedures that led to the
positive result, athletes have challenged the appeal procedures as well.160
The importance to USADA’s operations in avoiding a finding of state
action, and therefore constitutional challenges, is also illustrated in the events
surrounding the investigation of several elite track and field athletes, including

150. Id.
151. Id. at 56 (statement of Scott Blackmun, President of the USOC).
152. Id.
153. See Straubel, supra note 14, at 526–31 (discussing the cases of Olympic athletes Mary
Slaney and the Nandrolone Four).
154. This Article will not determine what, if anything, due process might require for an
accused athlete. For a discussion of these issues, see id. at 544–53.
155. Wendt, supra note 107, at 29; see Tygart, supra note 13, at 129 (describing the USADA
testing policy as “no fault”); Baldwin, supra note 35, at 281 (explaining that in the United States
athletes can appeal their drug test only on the basis of procedural mistakes in the testing).
156. Wendt, supra note 107, at 29.
157. See 2001 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 112, at 2 (describing the USADA Vision as
including a testing program that is “fair and impartial in its attempt to identify athletes who use
performance enhancing compounds . . . either intentionally . . . or inadvertently”).
158. Tygart, supra note 13, at 130.
159. See, e.g., Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 2001).
160. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505 U.S. 1301, 1301–02 (1992).
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Marion Jones, in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympics. Jones
was among those who were rumored to have obtained performance-enhancing
drugs from BALCO, and USADA was investigating her and others for doping
violations.161 Neither Jones nor any of the others under investigation had
failed drug tests.162 Commentators argued that Jones was being unfairly
tainted by USADA’s suggestions that she had used performance-enhancing
drugs when she had not failed a drug test.163 In maintaining her innocence,
Jones stated, “I am not going to engage in the United States Anti-Doping
Agency’s secret kangaroo court. I will answer questions in a public forum that
will be open for the entire world to see, hear, and evaluate . . . .”164 Part of the
frustration for Jones and the other targeted athletes included the fact that
USADA asserted that it could change the required burden of proof for
disqualifying an athlete while the investigations were underway. When the
doping violations allegedly had taken place, the applicable burden of proof was
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”165 During the investigations, however, USADA
noted that the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the
world governing federation for track and field, had decided to adopt the
standard used in the World Anti-Doping Code.166 That standard required only
that doping cases be proven “to the comfortable satisfaction” of the sanctioning
authority.167 USADA therefore asserted that it need no longer prove a doping
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a mid-stream change in the burden of
proof could give rise to a constitutional due process challenge if USADA were
in fact a state actor.
III. DOES THE CONSTITUTION APPLY TO USADA’S ACTIONS?
There are two potential ways that USADA’s actions would trigger the
constitutional rights of athletes affected by its actions. First, the Constitution
would apply to USADA if it were in fact a government entity.168 Second, the
Constitution would apply to USADA’s actions if, although it were a private
actor, USADA’s actions were “fairly attributable to the state” such that
USADA was engaged in state action.169 An examination of USADA indicates

161. See Williams & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2, at A15.
162. See Ban on U.S. Stars Expected: Jones Says She’d Sue if Doping Agency Bars Her from
Athens, HOUSTON CHRON., May 17, 2004, at 11.
163. Jenkins, supra note 12, at D1.
164. Sprinter Wants Public Dope Hearing, CBS NEWS, June 16, 2004, www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/07/31/national/main633257.shtml.
165. Doping Officials Lower Violation Standards, KTVU, June 14, 2004, www.ktvu.com/
balco/3417910/detail.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
169. See id. at 937.
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that it is likely not a government entity for constitutional purposes and that in
the typical doping case, it is not engaged in state action. However, in some
unique circumstances, USADA’s actions may be “fairly attributable to the
state.”
A.

Is USADA a Government Entity for Purposes of the Constitution?

Congress has designated USADA as the “official anti-doping agency” for
the United States.170 Accordingly, for Olympic and anti-doping purposes,
USADA is an instrumentality of the United States. The relevant question,
however, is whether USADA is “an agency or instrumentality of the United
States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government
by the Constitution.”171 It is important to note that in such an analysis, neither
USADA’s, Congress’s, nor the Executive Branch’s characterizations of
USADA’s status are determinative.172 As the Supreme Court has explained,
“The Constitution constrains governmental action ‘by whatever instruments or
in whatever modes that action may be taken.’”173
Courts have considered the question of whether a corporation is a
government entity in a variety of contexts, such as for purposes of sovereign
immunity,174 tax immunity,175 and the application of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.176 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lebron v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp.177 is the leading case on determining whether a
corporation is a government entity for constitutional purposes. In that case, the
Court considered a challenge to a decision by Amtrak to prohibit a politically
themed billboard display in Amtrak’s Pennsylvania Station in New York.178
The plaintiff, Lebron, claimed Amtrak’s refusal to permit the billboard space to
be rented for such a purpose violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.179
The Court noted at the outset that while actions of private entities may
“sometimes be regarded as governmental action for constitutional purposes,”
such an inquiry was not necessary because the plaintiff correctly argued that,

170. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555.
171. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995).
172. See id. at 392 (“If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Constitution regards as the
Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not such can no more relieve it of its First
Amendment restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from the Fourth Amendment.”).
173. Id. (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880)).
174. United States ex rel. Wood v. Am. Inst. in Taiwan, 286 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
175. United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1990).
176. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
177. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
178. Id. at 377.
179. Id.
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for constitutional purposes, “Amtrak [was] not a private entity but Government
itself.”180
The Court highlighted several factors that supported its conclusion that
Amtrak was part of the government for constitutional purposes. First, the
Court noted that Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of
1970 to further important government objectives regarding the “‘continuance
and improvement’ of railroad passenger service.”181 Second, the Amtrak board
was controlled by the government.182 The Act provided that the Amtrak board
would consist of “nine members, six of whom are appointed by the President
of the United States.”183 Two additional directors were to be appointed by the
holders of Amtrak’s preferred stock, which was held at that time by the
government.184 The ninth member of the board would be selected by the other
eight directors.185 As a result, the Court noted that “Amtrak is not merely in
the temporary control of the Government . . . [Amtrak] is established and
organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal
governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal
governmental appointees.”186 Additionally, the Act required Amtrak to submit
annual reports to the President and Congress.187 The Court explained that the
Act’s provision that Amtrak “will not be an agency or establishment of the
United States Government,” was dispositive of Amtrak’s status only “for
purposes of matters that are within Congress’s control,” and not for
constitutional purposes.188 Accordingly, the Court held that “where, as here,
the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of
governmental objectives, and it retains for itself permanent authority to appoint
a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the
Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”189
A court considering USADA’s status for constitutional purposes likely
would conclude that USADA is not part of the government under the Lebron
analysis. First, USADA is not a government-created corporation, but is instead
incorporated under the laws of the state of Colorado as a nonprofit

180. Id. at 378.
181. Id. at 384 (quoting Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 101, 84
Stat. 1327, 1328).
182. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 398.
187. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386.
188. Id. at 391–92 (quoting Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301,
84 Stat. 1327, 1330).
189. Id. at 400.
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corporation.190 Also, it does not currently have any special federal statute
laying out its purpose or other requirements of existence.191 While USADA
does operate with Congress’s designation that it is the official anti-doping
agency for the United States,192 and it is undoubtedly subject to some reporting
requirements with respect to the federal funding it receives, this is not the
equivalent of the statute enacted by Congress to create Amtrak, which
essentially codified the government’s permanent ability to control Amtrak’s
operations.193 Second, the government does not have the statutory right to
appoint USADA’s directors. While it was at least initially contemplated that
some of USADA’s directors would be appointed after consultation with
ONDCP,194 there is no evidence that this is the case. Even if some directors
were, as a matter of practice, appointed after consultation with ONDCP, this
would likely not be sufficient. The Supreme Court stressed in Lebron that the
ability to control the entity through the board must be “permanent” and the
control must be exercised through appointment of the majority of the board of
directors for the entity in question to be considered part of the government
itself.195
It might be suggested that the absence of a federal statute incorporating
USADA should not be determinative, as it is clear that USADA was created
with significant government involvement to serve important government
objectives. Indeed, the government worked in creating USADA with the
USOC, itself a corporation created by Congress.196 Moreover, at least initially,
ONDCP hoped USADA would be an agency of the government.197 There is
nothing in Lebron, however, that suggests that such a status would be enough
to make USADA a government entity. The Court’s holding in Lebron was
specific in that it applied to government-created corporations where the
government retains permanent, controlling authority through the board of

190. United States Anti-Doping Agency, Articles of Incorporation (Mar. 20, 2000),
http://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/ViewImage.do;jsessionid=0000VXWeka-BI8kS-2DZIOPXYjm:1
0e80j0vs?masterFileId=20001056949&fileId=20001056949.
191. This may soon change, however. At the time of this writing, there is a bill in the Senate
that designates USADA as the United States’ official anti-doping agency and sets out USADA’s
mission. See 151 CONG. REC. S2044 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley). The
bill requires USADA to submit reports to Congress and provides for increased funding to
USADA through FY 2010. See id.
192. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67 § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555.
193. See Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327; see also
notes 179–188 and accompanying text.
194. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 103 (Bill Hybl’s response to Sen. John
McCain’s written questions).
195. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 398, 400 (1995).
196. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 57 (statement of Scott Blackmun).
197. Id. at 83–84 (closing remarks of Barry McCaffrey).
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directors.198 This level of control is simply not present with USADA.
However, if it were discovered that in fact the government did exert the level
of control over USADA that it exerted over Amtrak, it might not be
determinative to the Court that such control is not specified in a federal statute.
The Court made clear that the Constitution applied to governmental action in
whatever form it took, and that it would not be swayed by declarations of an
entity’s “private” status.199
This restrictive view of Lebron, and its likely application to USADA, is
consistent with case law.200 Particularly pertinent is a decision by the Ninth
Circuit on whether the Red Cross was an instrumentality of the government for
purposes of the First Amendment.201 In that case, the Court held that the Red
Cross was not a government actor for constitutional purposes because “[t]he
daily affairs of the Red Cross are not controlled by government officials.”202
Moreover, the Court found it determinative that “the government [had] not
retained permanent authority to appoint the majority of the Red Cross
governing board . . . .”203 The Court found it irrelevant that the Red Cross was
held to be a government instrumentality in other contexts and that the
organization “performs many important functions for the United States”
government.204
Similarly, here, a court likely would find that USADA performs many
important functions both domestically and internationally in serving the United
States government’s Olympic Movement interests. Moreover, like the Red
Cross, USADA is in some aspects an instrumentality of the United States.
USADA participates in international conferences and in other international
anti-doping initiatives on behalf of the United States government.205 However,
Lebron and Hall v. American National Red Cross make clear that an entity’s
governmental status in one context is not determinative for purposes of
applying the Constitution to the entity’s actions.206 As stated by the court in
Hall, “Government-created corporations are often held to be tax-immune
government instrumentalities, but courts have also frequently found them not

198. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
199. Id. at 392.
200. See Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2004); BarriosVelazquez v. Asociacion De Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico, 84 F.3d 487,
492 (1st Cir. 1996); Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d
1401, 1406–09 (9th Cir. 1996).
201. See Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1996).
202. Id. at 922.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 922–23.
205. See 2001 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 112, at 3.
206. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Crop., 513 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1995); Hall, 86 F.3d at
922–23.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

116

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:91

to be subject to constitutional treatment as government actors.”207 Therefore,
like the Ninth Circuit in Hall, a court likely would find that USADA is not a
government entity for constitutional purposes.
B.

Are USADA’s Actions Fairly Attributable to the State?

Assuming that USADA is not a government entity, but is in fact private,
the next inquiry in determining whether the Constitution applies to its actions
is whether, in a particular case, USADA’s seemingly private action should be
deemed that of the state for constitutional purposes.208 While it is clear that
USADA enjoys a close relationship with the federal government, in most cases
USADA’s actions likely could not be deemed that of the state for
constitutional purposes. However, the events leading up to the 2004 Athens
Olympic Games show that in some instances, USADA’s actions might be
fairly attributable to the state.
Attributing seemingly private conduct to the government is difficult.209
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found state action in few cases. As the Court
stated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., requiring state action “preserves an area
of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial
power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials,
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”210 At
bottom, it must be determined whether the challenged action is “fairly
attributable to the State.”211
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while noting that the doctrine is
far from clear, has articulated a two-step inquiry for determining whether the
challenged action is “fairly attributable to the State.” First, it must be shown
that the allegedly unconstitutional action was the result of “the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State.”212 Second, the Court has stated
that in order to determine whether it is fair to attribute private actions to the
state, the Court must determine “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action.”213 The Court has articulated
several theories for finding the requisite “close nexus.” For instance, the Court
has explained that it can be fair to attribute private action to the government
where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
207. Hall, 86 F.3d at 922.
208. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
209. Hayward D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of State Action, 20
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 847, 890 (1994); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1413 (2003) (noting that the Court is “significantly more unwilling to find
state action”).
210. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936.
211. Id. at 937.
212. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
213. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed
to be that of the State”214 or where the “private actor operates as a ‘willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents[.]’”215 The Court has
also found state action where a private actor is “controlled by an ‘agency of the
State,’”216 or when the private actor has been delegated a function that has
been “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”217 More recently,
the Court stated that the “pervasive entwinement” of state officials in the
structure of an ostensibly private entity would be enough to support a finding
of state action.218
In short, the Court has made it clear that constitutional standards apply
only “when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct”
at issue.219 However, as the Court explained in Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, the analysis of what conduct the
state is “responsible for” is not one that is undertaken with reference to brightline rules or criteria.220 Instead, the Court stressed that there is not one set of
facts or circumstances that establish state action, and that if state action is
shown under one theory, it is not relevant that the facts might not amount to
state action under a different test.221 As a result, the Court stated, “[E]xamples
may be the best teachers . . . .”222
1.

Nothing Would Preclude a Finding of State Action Against USADA

As an initial matter, it is likely that a court would find that USADA’s
actions meet the first prong of the state action inquiry. Because of its
designation by Congress as the United States’ “official” anti-doping agency,223
and its resulting exclusive authority to test and sanction all United States
Olympic Movement athletes, USADA is exercising a right and privilege given
to it by Congress.
Thus, the remaining question is whether USADA’s actions are “fairly
attributable to the State.” One of the leading examples to be used in this
analysis is the case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States

214. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
215. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)
(quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941).
216. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir., 353 U.S. 230, 231
(1957)).
217. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
218. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
219. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (emphasis omitted).
220. 531 U.S. at 295–96.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 296.
223. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555.
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Olympic Committee,224 which involved a state action challenge to the
USOC.225 It might be argued that because the Court in San Francisco Arts
held that the USOC was not a state actor under the circumstances of that
case,226 USADA likewise is not a state actor because it performs functions that
were previously performed by the USOC. Such an assumption, however,
would misread San Francisco Arts and ignore key differences between the
USOC and USADA.
In San Francisco Arts, the USOC brought suit against San Francisco Arts
and Athletics, Inc., an organization that was attempting to organize and
promote the “Gay Olympic Games,” seeking to prohibit it from using the word
“Olympic” in its materials.227 San Francisco Arts first argued that the Amateur
Sports Act, which gave the USOC the exclusive right to control the use of the
Olympic words and symbols, afforded the USOC nothing more than the usual
trademark protection.228 As a result, San Francisco Arts argued it could rely on
defenses provided by the Lanham Act.229 The Court disagreed, holding that
the Amateur Sports Act granted the USOC exclusive use of the word Olympic,
thereby providing more protection to Olympic marks and trademark than given
in the usual trademark case.230 The Court found that this did not violate the
First Amendment.231
In addition, San Francisco Arts argued that the USOC’s enforcement of its
exclusive right to the marks in this case violated Equal Protection under the
Fifth Amendment.232 The threshold issue for the Court, therefore, was whether
the USOC was a state actor such that the Constitution would apply to its
actions.233 The Court noted that the USOC is a private corporation chartered
by Congress.234 In the Amateur Sports Act, Congress imposed certain
requirements on the USOC such as reporting on its operations and
expenditures in a yearly report to Congress.235 In addition, the USOC received
some federal funding.236 Aside from its relationship to the federal government
as outlined in the Amateur Sports Act, there was no other evidence that the
Government was involved in the trademark enforcement determinations that
224. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
225. Id. at 542–47.
226. See id. at 547.
227. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 524–25.
228. Id. at 528.
229. Id. at 530.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 534–35, 540.
232. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 542.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 542–43.
235. Id. at 543 n. 23; see Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 113, 92 Stat.
3045, 3049 (1978) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 220511 (2000)).
236. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 543.
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the USOC made with respect to San Francisco Arts’ use of the word Olympic
and accompanying marks.237
The Court stated that on these facts, San Francisco Arts could not show
state action.238 First, the Court explained that extensive regulation of a private
entity “does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the
government.”239 Second, the Court stated that the USOC’s receipt of
government funding did not change the analysis.240 The Court stated that
“[t]he Government may subsidize private entities without assuming
constitutional responsibility for their actions.”241 Finally, the Court held that
state action could be found where the entity at issue “performs functions that
have been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative’ of the Federal
Government.”242 While the Court acknowledged that the USOC’s activities
served “a national interest,” it held that this fact was not enough to make the
USOC’s actions governmental action.243 The Court held that “[n]either the
conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional
governmental function.”244 Significantly, the Court also explained that state
action normally can only be found where the government has exercised “such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the government.”245 The Court noted that in this case,
there was simply no evidence that the government coerced or encouraged the
USOC in its decision to deny San Francisco Arts the use of the Olympic
mark.246
Based on this, it cannot be said that the USOC is a private actor in all
circumstances as a matter of law.247 San Francisco Arts stands for the
proposition that the USOC is not a state actor under the “traditional public
function theory” because the USOC does not perform functions that were
traditionally the “exclusive prerogative” of the government. The “public
function” theory was San Francisco Arts’ primary argument that the USOC’s
action amounted to state action, since it was unable to show that the challenged
action, the denial of the use of the Olympic mark, had any specific relationship
237. Id. at 546.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 544 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)).
240. Id.
241. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 544 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982)).
242. Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)) (emphasis omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 545.
245. Id. at 546 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
246. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 547.
247. See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 884 F.2d 524, 530 (1989) (holding that the
USOC is not a governmental actor); Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476,
1479 (D. Or. 1994) (holding the defendant United States Figure Skating Association to be “a
private association, not a governmental body”).
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to the United States Government. There was no allegation that any member of
the government even knew that the dispute over the use of the Olympic mark
was occurring, much less that anyone connected to the government was
involved in denying or otherwise “coercing or encouraging” the USOC to deny
the plaintiffs the use of the mark.248 Thus, San Francisco Arts can only be read
for the narrow holding that the USOC is not performing a traditional public
function, and only under that theory is it not engaged in state action. There is
nothing in San Francisco Arts, however, that would preclude a finding of state
action in other circumstances. San Francisco Arts explicitly contemplated that
where there is evidence of government coercion or encouragement of a USOC
decision, a finding of state action could be appropriate.249 At most, then, San
Francisco Arts would support the argument that USADA does not perform a
traditional public function so that it is not a state actor under that theory. San
Francisco Arts clearly leaves open the possibility, however, that USADA
could be a state actor, at least in some circumstances, if other indicia of state
action are present.
Still, even if San Francisco Arts could be construed as holding that the
USOC is not a state actor in all circumstances as a matter of law, such a
holding would not necessarily be applicable to USADA. USADA’s
relationship with the federal government, both through the Executive Branch
and with Congress, is meaningfully different than the relationship between the
USOC and the federal government. For instance, while the USOC is mostly
self-supporting, and not reliant on government funding, USADA receives the
majority of its operating budget from the federal government.250 Moreover,
while the USOC has always been subject to Congressional oversight, USADA
is subject to direction and influence not just by Congress but also the ONDCP,
which has taken a direct interest in its operation.251 Accordingly, USADA’s
actions in a specific case must be reviewed to determine whether they are fairly
attributable to the government.
2.

USADA’s Actions Generally Will Not Be Fairly Attributable to the
Government

As explained above, for the Constitution to apply to USADA’s conduct, it
must be shown that ultimately, the state is “responsible” for USADA’s actions
such that USADA “may fairly be said to be a state actor.”252 An important
248. See S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 547.
249. See id. at 546.
250. See 151 CONG. REC. S2044 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting
that “the Federal Government has provided approximately 60 percent of USADA’s operational
budget”).
251. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Executive Office of the President Office of
National Drug Control Policy–United States Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., Mar. 20, 2003.
252. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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step in such an inquiry is to determine the specific conduct of which a plaintiff
who brings suit against USADA would complain.253 Here, the challenged
action would be the finding that an athlete had violated the relevant antidoping code. Because in routine cases such a finding is not made with any
government involvement, USADA’s actions likely would not be fairly
attributable to the state.
a.

USADA Does Not Perform a Traditional Public Function

The Supreme Court has explained that it is fair to attribute a private
entity’s actions to the state where the entity performs a function that is
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”254 Such functions have
been defined as those where the state is uniquely obligated to provide the
services in question.255 It has been noted that this is an “arduous standard to
satisfy.”256 In addition, the Supreme Court has made clear that a private actor
that engages in conduct which is beneficial to the public does not transform its
actions into state action.257 The Supreme Court has found a traditional public
function to be present in only a narrow range of circumstances, such as the
administration of elections258 and municipal parks.259 The Court has declined
to find a traditional public function in cases involving the coordination of
amateur athletics260 and the education of special needs children.261
Given the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to the traditional public
function theory, it is clear that USADA does not perform a function that
traditionally has been “the exclusive prerogative of the state.” First, there is
nothing which obligates the government to drug test Olympic Movement
athletes. While it can be argued that the international agreements the United
States has entered into to fight doping obligate it to provide for drug testing of
athletes, there is nothing that specifies the government itself must do the
testing and apply the sanctions. Second, drug testing in general has never been
the exclusive prerogative of government. Thousands of private entities use the
practice to ensure that their employees, students, and the like are drug free.262

253. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S 40, 51 (1999) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
254. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
255. Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 55–56.
256. Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002).
257. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
258. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89
(1932).
259. E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
260. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
261. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 836–37.
262. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, Workplace Drug Testing Programs (July 1, 2003), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
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In fact, USADA’s own history shows that drug testing was not traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the government—it is because the anti-doping
program was ineffectively handled by the USOC that the federal government
got involved.263 Finally, given that the Supreme Court has found that the
USOC is not performing a traditional government function, it is unlikely that a
court would hold that USADA, which tests and sanctions athletes as part of the
USOC’s overall eligibility determination process, is performing one.
b.

Substantial Government Funding and Regulation Are Not Enough to
Support a Finding of State Action

It is well settled that where a private actor is heavily regulated or where the
state creates the legal framework for the challenged action, this alone is not
enough for a finding of state action.264 Accordingly, although USADA
receives about sixty percent of its operating budget from the federal
government, and the government designated USADA as the United States’
“official” anti-doping agency, this falls short of the government involvement
required for a finding of state action.
Several cases are instructive in this regard. For instance, in American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,265 the Court considered
whether there was state action in a case challenging a decision by a private
insurer to withhold payment for medical services under a state workers’
compensation program.266 The state statute governing the program authorized
employers to withhold payments for potentially unnecessary medical treatment
pending utilization review.267 The Court held that such conduct was not fairly
attributable to the state because the decision to deny payment for medical
services was made by private insurers and the only involvement by the state
was through the statute that authorized those private parties to make the
challenged decision.268 The Court noted that the state’s decision to allow
workers’ compensation insurers to withhold payment for medical services
pending utilization review in some way can be seen as “encouraging” them to
do so, but that “this kind of subtle encouragement is no more significant than
that which inheres in the State’s creation or modification of any legal

NHSDA/A-11/WrkplcPlcy2-06.htm#P136_7936 (describing survey of American workers, fortynine percent of whom reported some kind of workplace drug testing in 1997).
263. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 10 (keynote remarks of Barry
McCaffrey).
264. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842;
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1974).
265. 526 U.S 40 (1999).
266. Id. at 43–44.
267. Id. at 45.
268. Id. at 52, 59.
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remedy.”269 For state action to be found, the Court stated that there must be
some “overt, significant assistance of state officials.”270
This is similar to the holding in Blum v. Yaretsky.271 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that the decisions of a nursing home subject to various
Medicaid and other state regulations were not subject to constitutional
attack.272 The Court noted that although the applicable Medicaid guidelines
encouraged the hospital’s decisions to discharge its patients as soon as
possible, the state was not “responsible” for those actions because the
“decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and
nursing home administrators, all of whom are concededly private parties.”273
Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,274 several teachers brought suit against a
private school, asserting unconstitutional state action, after they were
terminated for speaking out against the school’s director.275 Public funds made
up 90–99% of the school’s budget, and students were transferred to the school
pursuant to state law.276 With respect to the named petitioner, Rendell-Baker,
a state board had to approve the initial hiring decision.277 In addition, that
same state board upheld the school’s decision to terminate Rendell-Baker.278
The Supreme Court held that despite the school’s close ties to the state, the
decision to terminate the teachers was not subject to challenge on
constitutional grounds because the decisions were not mandated or otherwise
influenced by any state regulation.279 As a result, although the school was
subject to extensive regulation, the Court found that there could be no state
action because nothing indicated the state was involved in any way in the
personnel matters at issue.280 The Court stated that the school’s decisions to
discharge the petitioners were not compelled or influenced by state authority:
“Indeed, in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the

269. Id. at 53.
270. Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 54 (quoting Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 486 U.S.
478, 485 (1988)). American Manufacturers involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
526 U.S. at 49. It is well settled that the “under color of [state] law” inquiry used for § 1983
“has[ ] been treated as the same thing as the state action” requirement. United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
271. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
272. Id. at 1012.
273. Id. at 1005.
274. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
275. Id. at 832, 834–35.
276. Id. at 832.
277. Id. at 833.
278. Id. at 834.
279. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
280. Id. at 841–42.
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various regulators showed relatively little interest in the school’s personnel
matters.”281
The case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company282 is also a useful
example. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against Metropolitan Edison
for terminating her electricity.283 The Court noted that while the electric
company was privately owned and operated, it was subject to extensive state
regulation.284 However, the Court rejected the argument that furnishing
electricity was a power traditionally reserved to the state.285 Moreover, the
Court held that the actions of the electric company were not state action
because the state had not placed its “imprimatur” on the challenged action.286
The Court explained that a private entity’s exercise of discretion permitted by
statute, without additional state involvement, does not make the private entity’s
action state action.287
These cases are all consistent with the Court’s holding in San Francisco
Arts, where the Court stated that the USOC’s actions were not subject to
constitutional challenge because there was nothing in the record to indicate that
the government had any interest in the USOC’s decision to deny the plaintiffs
the right to use the Olympic trademarks.288 Therefore, where the challenged
action is ultimately taken by private parties, and the only indicia of state
involvement is funding and regulation, this is not enough for a finding of state
action.
Here, USADA is not as heavily regulated or dependent on government
funding as the entities in American Manufacturers, Rendell-Baker, Blum, or
Jackson. However, similarly to those cases, it is a private entity that would
perform the action subject to challenge. Moreover, as in the above cases, there
is nothing to indicate that the government would take any interest or
involvement in the challenged action (here, routine athlete drug testing).
While the federal government helped create USADA and places great weight
on fighting doping, this alone would not be enough. As the Court stated in
Blum, “Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is
not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under

281. Id. at 841. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding
that there was no state action where the state Liquor Control Board had given a liquor license to a
private club that refused to serve African Americans where there was no showing that the state
Liquor Control Board had a role in establishing or enforcing the policy).
282. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
283. Id. at 347.
284. Id. at 350.
285. Id. at 353.
286. Id. at 357.
287. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
288. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546–47 (1987).
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the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”289 Accordingly, as in the cases
discussed above, it is unlikely that a usual case involving a constitutional
challenge to USADA’s actions, based merely on the federal government’s
funding and oversight of USADA, would succeed.
c.

The Government is Not Pervasively Entwined in USADA’s
Operations

Another potential theory to demonstrate that USADA’s actions are fairly
attributable to the government is that USADA is “pervasively entwined” with
the government.290 This argument also likely would fail. In Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, the Supreme Court
found that a state high school athletic association was engaged in state action
where the plaintiff demonstrated that the state was responsible for the decisions
of the nominally private athletic association because public officials were
pervasively entwined in the management and control of the association.291 In
that case, the Court noted that the state was entwined from the “top down” in
that employees of the state’s board of education sat on many of the athletic
association’s committees, and because employees of the athletic association
were part of the state retirement system.292 The state was also entwined from
the “bottom up” in that an overwhelming majority of the members of the
association were public high schools represented by school principals and
others acting in their official capacities.293 The Court noted that “[t]here would
be no recognizable [Athletic] Association, legal or tangible, without the public
school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all
but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and
functions . . . .”294
In contrast, USADA is not in any way controlled on a day-to-day basis by
public officials. There are no public officials on USADA’s board of directors,
and there are no public officials working in the day-to-day management of
USADA.295 While at most it can be argued that the private individuals who
control USADA are friendly to the government’s anti-doping agenda,296 this
alone is not enough to show the type of “largely overlapping identity”297 that

289. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982).
290. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
291. Id. at 298 (“The nominally private character of the [Athletic] Association is overborne
by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and
workings . . . .”).
292. Id. at 300.
293. Id. at 299–300.
294. Id. at 300.
295. See 2004 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 8, at 4–7.
296. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 15 (statement of Frank Shorter).
297. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303.
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was critical to the Court’s holding of “pervasive entwinement” in Brentwood.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that a Court would find that USADA engaged in
state action under this theory.
d.

In Most Cases, USADA’s Actions Are Not the Result of Joint Action
with the Government or Significant Government Coercion or
Encouragement

The Supreme Court has held that state action may be found where a private
entity is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”298
In addition, the Court repeatedly has stressed that actions are fairly attributable
to the state where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State.”299 In the usual case involving the testing and sanctioning of an
athlete, there would be no evidence of joint action or significant coercion and
encouragement sufficient to support a finding of state action.
To establish state action based on a “joint action” theory, it must be shown
that the private party took the challenged action with the “overt, significant
assistance of state officials,”300 or has worked “in concert” with state officials
to effectuate the deprivation of constitutional rights.301 Moreover, a showing
of state action under the “coercion and encouragement theory” requires more
than “mere approval or acquiescence,” or “subtle encouragement.”302 The
level of government involvement under these theories of state action is not
present in the typical drug testing case. As USADA notes in its most recent
annual report, it conducted a total of 7,360 drug tests during the year.303 Of
these, it made forty-three “adverse findings.”304 It also issued sanctions in
forty-one pending cases.305 Given this volume, it is hard to imagine how
Congress or ONDCP or any other arm of the government would have the
ability to be involved in USADA’s actions at the level required to support a
finding of state action under these theories. In addition, even if Congress and
ONDCP remained informed of USADA’s day-to-day actions with respect to
298. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quoting U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 (1966)); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
299. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982)).
300. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (quoting Tulsa Prof’l
Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988)); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 927;
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 155–56 (1970).
301. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838 n.6; see also Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert,
49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
302. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52–53 (1999).
303. 2004 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 8, at 2.
304. Id. at 16 (noting that three of the adverse results were not from U.S. athletes and “were
referred to the appropriate country or [international federation]”).
305. Id. at 34 (listing the athletes and the sanctions imposed).
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testing and sanctions, there is simply no showing that Congress or ONDCP, in
the usual case, has any interest in, or influence over, the outcome. Most
decisions subject to challenge would not be made by any government official,
and government employees do not assist with testing or sanctioning athletes.
Unlike cases where the “joint action” theory has been invoked, such as with
pre-judgment attachment of property by ex parte application to a state
official,306 or the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,307 USADA does
not need the participation of any state official to test and sanction athletes in
routine cases. Moreover, while the government clearly approves of and
encourages generally the process of testing and sanctioning athletes, there is
nothing to suggest that in the usual case, it coerces or significantly encourages
USADA to take a specific action or reach a particular outcome. Therefore,
notwithstanding USADA’s substantial government funding and oversight, with
respect to the typical doping case, a court is unlikely to hold that USADA’s
actions are fairly attributable to the state.
3.

In Unique Circumstances, USADA’s Actions May Be Fairly
Attributable to the State

The conclusion that USADA’s actions, in routine doping cases, likely
would not be fairly attributable to the government, however, does not mean
that USADA could never be considered a state actor. Indeed, USADA’s close
relationship with the federal government may, under certain circumstances,
make it particularly vulnerable to a finding of state action. As the Supreme
Court has stated, “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance.”308 Weighing the circumstances of USADA’s close relationship
with the federal government with the events that occurred during the months
leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games illustrates that USADA may, in
some cases, be a state actor.
a.

USADA’s Relationship with the Federal Government Positions It To
Be a State Actor

The Supreme Court’s requirement that for there to be state action there
must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action”309 assumes that the state has a relationship with the private entity such
that the state actually could coerce, encourage, jointly participate with, or
otherwise control the private actor to achieve the challenged action. USADA
and the federal government have such a relationship.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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First, both Lebron and Brentwood demonstrate that the government’s
creation of a nominally private entity to serve important government interests
positions the private entity for a finding of state action. Here, as explained
above, it was the government, particularly ONDCP and the Senate Committee,
that took the lead in forming USADA.310As Michael Straubel noted, USADA
was established and “assigned specific tasks with a set of preexisting
guidelines.”311 Moreover, as in Lebron and Brentwood, because USADA was
created to fulfill important government objectives, the federal government has
a continuing interest in and influence over its operations. This is illustrated
when viewed in comparison to the United States’ professional sports leagues.
For instance, when the World Anti-Doping Code was adopted, it was hoped
that the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and other American professional sports
leagues would adopt it.312 The leagues refused, preferring instead to test and
sanction their respective athletes pursuant to their collective bargaining
agreements.313 In contrast, such a refusal to adopt the WADC was never an
option for USADA.314 In addition, USADA’s role as an entity to serve
government interests is further demonstrated with respect to the recent
scandals involving performance-enhancing drug use and professional sports.315
While holding hearings on the issue, Congress has explicitly considered
expanding USADA’s jurisdiction to assist in coordinating drug testing for
professional and college athletes.316 Indeed, when USADA was in the
developmental stage, members of Congress and ONDCP hoped that by
establishing USADA, the government could eventually fight the use of
performance-enhancing drugs at both the professional and collegiate level.317
As stated by Jim Scherr, during Congressional hearings on steroids and
professional sports “it was suggested that perhaps USADA should be expanded
to perform the same function for the professional leagues and perhaps the
NCAA that it does for the American Olympic Movement. . . . [W]e believe
that the proposal warrants serious consideration.”318 The ability of Congress
even to consider “expanding” USADA demonstrates that USADA is not
simply a private actor, but an entity that was created to serve important public
objectives. As a result, USADA is positioned to be influenced by the federal
government in a way that supports a finding of state action.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
Straubel, supra note 14, at 561.
See Wendt, supra, note 107, at 29–30.
See id.
2005 USADA GUIDE TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES, supra note 110, at 2.
See supra notes 2–10, 161–67 and accompanying text.
Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Barry McCaffrey).
Id.
S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Jim Scherr).
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Also illustrating USADA’s propensity to be influenced by the government
is that the government has a mutually beneficial relationship with USADA.
Such a mutually beneficial relationship can be important in establishing state
action.319 First, USADA relies heavily on government subsidies in the form of
grant funding through ONDCP.320 Significantly, in its four years of existence,
USADA has received increasing financial support from the federal
government. For instance, in 2001, it received $3.3 million to support its
operations.321 By 2004, the support had grown to more than $7.1 million.322
Also significant is the fact that the funding requests are tied to expansion of
USADA’s programs.323 Therefore, since its creation, USADA has seemingly
become increasingly dependent on government funding. USADA also has taxexempt status.324
In addition to funding, USADA directly benefits from its relationship with
the federal government in that it is designated by Congress as the United
States’ official anti-doping agency.325 This designation provides USADA with
the international and domestic authority and credibility it needs to achieve its
mission. Without such a designation, USADA would be unable to represent
the United States internationally in such forums as the Council of Americas,
the Council of Europe, and WADA.326 As stated by Terry Madden, the CEO
of USADA, in testimony given for the White House Task Force on Drug Use
in Sports, it was important to have the official “imprimatur” of the United
States government so that USADA could be “invited to the table of the Council
of Europe”327 and other international anti-doping conferences.
The benefits USADA derives from its relationship with the federal
government were even more important during the months leading up to the
2004 Athens Olympics. USADA was a fledgling organization, having been in
existence for less than four years, and it relied heavily on the United States
government for funding and domestic and international credibility. Indeed, in
2002 and 2003 USADA worked closely with Republican lobbyists who had
close ties to the President to help it lobby for additional federal funding.328 As
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
151 CONG. REC. S2044 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
2001 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 112, at 24.
2004 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 8, at 28.
See 151 CONG. REC. S2044 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS
DESCRIBED IN § 170(C) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Publication No. 78, June 30,
2005), http://apps.irs.gov/app/pub78 (search the database search field for “anti-doping agency”).
325. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555.
326. See 2002 USADA ANN. REP. 14, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/
who/annual_report_2002.pdf.
327. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 29.
328. USADA: Four Years Later, KEEPING TRACK NEWSL. (Janet Heinonen, Eugene, Or.),
Mar. 2005, available at http://keepingtracknewsletter.com/archive/index.php?keepingtrack=56.
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a result, USADA during this time was especially concerned with cultivating its
relationship with the United States government and continuing to receive the
benefits it needed to establish itself.
Likewise, the United States government greatly benefits from its
relationship with USADA. First, USADA enhances the United States’ image
in the international Olympic Movement. Prior to the creation of USADA, as
mentioned above, the United States was embroiled in doping scandals that
badly damaged its reputation.329 The perception was that the United States
turned a blind eye to performance-enhancing drug use by its elite athletes.
USADA, however, has enhanced significantly the United States’ credibility
with respect to anti-doping, both at home and abroad. Moreover, USADA
benefits the federal government by actively supporting federal anti-drug
initiatives. Funding requests for USADA are made by ONDCP to Congress as
part of ONDCP’s request for funds to implement other Federal Drug Control
Programs.330 This is due to the fact that USADA was created not simply to
drug test Olympic Movement athletes, but to educate children on the dangers
of performance-enhancing drug use and to conduct research.331 Additionally,
as noted above, some members of Congress now hope to use USADA to shape
the drug testing and sanctions regimes of the major professional sports
leagues.332
USADA also is in a position to be influenced by the federal government
because in many respects, it appears to be an agent of the government.333
Again, as mentioned previously, USADA is designated as the United States’
official anti-doping agency.334 Such an official designation was found to be
important in the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Brentwood, where the Court
noted that the school board “[s]pecifically, in 1972 . . . went so far as to adopt a
rule expressly ‘designating’ the Association as ‘the organization to supervise
and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high

329. See Straubel, supra note 14, at 554.
330. See ONDCP 2004 Budget Request, supra note 128 (addendum to statement of John P.
Walters).
331. See 2002 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 326, at 3.
332. See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
333. In undertaking a state action inquiry, the Supreme Court has explained that “the
character of a legal entity is determined neither by its expressly private characterization in
statutory law, nor by the failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from
recognized government officials or agencies.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (citing Lebron v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 US.
374 (1995)). Thus, even if USADA and the government maintained that USADA was a private
entity, such a designation would not be determinative.
334. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67 § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555; see also S. 529
Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Jim Scherr).
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schools in Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.’”335 This
designation was among the facts that tipped the scale in that case toward a
finding of state action.336 Moreover, such a designation or apparent agency
relationship was absent from cases where the Court held that government
funding and government regulation, without more, was insufficient to support
a finding of state action.337
In addition to its official designation, USADA and its actions, in many
cases, carry the imprimatur of the United States government.338 Such an
“imprimatur,” or approval, can be important in finding state action.339
USADA’s actions appear to be approved by the United States government
because the very policies that USADA is enforcing, through the WADC, are
policies that the United States not only has seen and approved, but had a part in
drafting. As explained above, the United States played a significant role in
establishing WADA and establishing the WADC,340 which USADA now
enforces.341 This is similar to the rules involved in Brentwood, where the
Supreme Court noted that the state high school athletic association there had
reviewed and approved of the rules at issue in the case.342 Here, not only has
the United States government reviewed the WADC, it had a substantial hand in
actually crafting it, and it retains the authority, through its position on the
WADA board, to influence its shape in the future.
Moreover, the “imprimatur” of the federal government is most apparent to
the athletes who are tested and sanctioned by USADA. For instance, when the

335. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 292 (quoting TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-1-2-.26 (1972), a
provision later moved to Rule 0520-1-2-.08).
336. See id. at 300–02.
337. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
338. It is important to note as an initial matter that USADA and the federal government’s
designation of USADA as the “independent” anti-doping agency is not necessarily a statement of
USADA’s relationship to the government. In fact, the designation probably has less to do with
asserting USADA’s independence from the federal government than an attempt to stress that it is
separate from the USOC, so that the previous conflicts of interest present when the USOC
handled the United States’ anti-doping program are no longer present. Thus, this “independent”
designation appears to be more about international credibility, and less a statement of its position
vis-à-vis the federal government. In any event, state action cases establish that this designation is
not determinative.
339. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
340. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. Indeed, even before WADA was formed and the
WADC drafted the United States played a significant role in shaping Olympic Movement drug
policy to serve domestic interests. For instance, ONDCP pushed the IOC to make marijuana a
banned substance. See Kathy Orton, U.S. Supports New Drug Standards: McCaffrey Pledges $1
Million Toward Advanced Olympic Testing, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at D3.
341. 2005 USADA GUIDE TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES, supra note 110, at 2.
342. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 292 (2001).
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BALCO scandal was unfolding, many athletes were aware of the Senate
Committee’s assistance with USADA’s investigation of athletes for doping
violations. In responding to allegations that she had used THG, sprinter
Marion Jones attempted to clear her name by offering to publicly answer any
questions from USADA.343 Jones stated that “[w]e can answer these questions
before the United States Senate, which has shown an interest in this
matter . . . .”344 Moreover, as stated by Kelli White, a track and field athlete
who admitted using BALCO-engineered steroids to the Senate Committee, “I
appreciate the many reasons why this Committee previously subpoenaed the
BALCO documents pertaining only to the track and field athletes and turned
them over to USADA rather than the other sports, but would like to see a more
equal treatment of all sports.”345 In short, the United States government,
through ONDCP and Congress, has put its considerable “power and
prestige”346 behind USADA, both domestically and internationally. As such,
USADA is markedly different from the private entities at issue in Jackson,
American Manufacturers, Blum, Rendell-Baker and Moose Lodge, and
therefore it is uniquely positioned to engage in state action.
b.

The Events Leading Up to 2004 Athens Olympic Games

Positioned as it was to be a state actor, it is not surprising that USADA was
significantly aided and encouraged by the federal government to target
potential dopers in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.
These events, combined with the factors outlined above, would make a strong
case for state action.
In 2004, the BALCO scandal, and the professional and amateur athletes
caught in it, was a matter of concern in the highest levels of government.
Indeed, President Bush mentioned the issue of doping in sports in his State of
the Union Address.347 These concerns increased in the spring of that year, as
the United States was preparing to select its teams for the Athens Olympic
Games. Given the United States’ past reputation for allowing dopers to remain
eligible for competition, there was intense pressure to ensure that the United
States sent a “clean” team to the Games.348 Specifically, Senator John McCain
and the Senate Committee were deeply concerned that track and field athletes
implicated in the BALCO scandal might compete in Athens.349 Yet without
the information from the BALCO grand jury investigation, USADA was
343. Sprinter Wants Public Dope Hearing, supra note 164.
344. Id.
345. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Kelli White).
346. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 559 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
347. See Bush, supra note 35, at 100.
348. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
349. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., supra note 6.
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seemingly powerless to bring doping cases against those who may have used
the previously undetectable THG. Accordingly, to prevent any BALCOtainted athletes from going to Athens, the Senate Committee subpoenaed
documents from the Department of Justice that were part of the ongoing
BALCO investigation.350 As stated by Senator John McCain:
I continue to be keenly interested in curbing the use of banned performanceenhancing drugs by our nation’s athletes. To that end, this morning the
Committee approved . . . the issuance of a subpoena . . . . [T]he subpoena
would compel the Department of Justice to produce documents relating to U.S.
amateur athletes’ alleged purchase of banned performance-enhancing
substances from [BALCO] and their possible use of such substances.351

The Department of Justice did not object to the subpoena, as would be
expected, but in fact was “happy” to comply.352 It was widely reported that
such willing compliance—turning over secret grand jury testimony to
Congress during an ongoing investigation—was highly unusual, and “virtually
without precedent.”353 After the material was provided to the Senate
Committee, the Committee turned the material over to USADA. This action
was explained in a Senate Resolution, which stated, in pertinent part:
Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or in the possession
of the Senate is needed for the promotion of justice, the Senate will take such
action as will promote the ends of justice consistent with the privileges of the
Senate: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, acting jointly, are authorized to
provide to the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency the documents subpoenaed by the
Committee regarding the potential use of banned, performance-enhancing
drugs by U.S. Olympic sport athletes.354

As stated by Senator Ted Stevens, during a hearing on a bill to increase
funding to USADA, “The actions that we took as a Committee last year
ensured that the United States did not send athletes who were not drug-free to
Athens. Those were unprecedented actions . . . .”355

350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See Ford Fessenden, Government’s Handling of Evidence from BALCO Case is Not
Typical, N.Z. SPORTS DRUG AGENCY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.nzsda.co.nz/news.php?
type=archive&nid=176.
353. Slot, supra note 5 at 46. But see Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Steroid
Scandal May Hit Olympics: U.S. Athletes Could Get Yanked—Even without Drug Tests, S.F.
CHRON., May 16, 2004, at A1 (noting that the subpoenaed material did not include grand jury
transcripts, but included “items such as e-mails, letters, invoices and canceled checks”).
354. 150 CONG. REC. S5004 (daily ed. May 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist).
355. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123.
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A strong argument can be made that the Senate Committee’s efforts to
assist USADA in taking action against certain athletes356 constituted the
requisite “joint action” with, and significant encouragement of, the federal
government to support a finding of state action.357 As explained above, it is
well established that a private party engages in state action where it jointly
participates with the state in taking the challenged action.358 Courts have noted
this requires a showing of overt and significant state participation in the
challenged action, or a clear “concerted effort” between the state and the
private entity.359 This level of participation and cooperation between USADA
and the federal government was evident in the actions taken to secure sanctions
against athletes implicated in the BALCO scandal leading up to the Athens
Olympic Games.
First, the decision to pursue sanctions against athletes based on information
obtained from the BALCO investigation was done in concert with the federal
officials, specifically the Senate Committee, who provided USADA with
material obtained as part of a government investigation. Such a joint effort
likely would be enough of a close nexus to support a finding of state action.
For instance, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,360 the Court found state action
where a public official, the local sheriff, facilitated the challenged action.361 In
that case, a private party to whom the plaintiff was allegedly indebted filed an
ex parte petition for attachment of the plaintiff’s property.362 The county
sheriff executed the petition.363 At a subsequent hearing, the plaintiff
established that the private creditor had not properly established grounds for
attachment.364 The plaintiff then brought suit for violation of his due process
rights.365 The Supreme Court held that the sheriff’s “joint participation” with
356. It is unclear which athletes were implicated in the documents, as the contents have not
been made public. However, after receiving the BALCO information from the Senate
Committee, USADA began proceedings against track and field athletes Tim Montgomery, Alvin
Harrison, Chryste Gaines, and Michelle Collins for “potential” doping violations. See Tim
Brown, Now Baseball May Get Tested, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at D1.
357. Note that it is not necessary to demonstrate that the impetus for the challenged action
originated with the federal government for there to be state action if it is state action that enforces
the private entity’s actions. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961);
see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
358. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 927 (1982); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 26–27 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
359. See Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995);
Starnes v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994); Hoai v. Vo., 935 F.2d
308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
360. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
361. Id. at 942.
362. Id. at 924.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 925.
365. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 925.
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the private party to seize the plaintiff’s property was sufficient to characterize
that party as a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.366
Similarly, the Supreme Court found state action in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete, Co.,367 where the Court held that a private litigant engaged in state
action in the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges because of the
“overt, significant[,]” and “indispensable” participation of the court.368
Here, a court could find that the federal government did not simply
authorize and approve of USADA’s actions,369 it indispensably aided and
encouraged them. Like the private party’s reliance on the sheriff in Lugar, and
the private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges in Edmonson, but for the
Senate Committee’s involvement, USADA probably could not have obtained
access to the grand jury material and made a case for sanctions against
otherwise “clean” athletes.370 Moreover, far from having a neutral connection
to USADA’s actions, the Senate Committee subpoenaed the grand jury
materials for a singular purpose—preventing certain athletes from going to the
Athens Olympics. This is very likely the type of “overt, significant assistance”
and “encouragement”371 with the force of the government’s “power and
prestige”372 that can be sufficient to support a finding of state action.
The case for state action is also strong in these circumstances because the
level of interest and involvement in the operations of USADA on the part of
the Senate Committee distinguishes USADA’s relationship with the federal
government during the months leading up to the Athens Olympics from the
relationships between the private actors and the state in Moose Lodge, Jackson,
Blum, Rendell-Baker, American Manufacturers, and San Francisco Arts. In
none of those cases did the state take any interest in, or have any involvement
with, the challenged actions. In fact, there was nothing to suggest that the state
in those cases had any direct knowledge that the challenged actions even took
place. Here, in contrast, the Senate Committee was heavily involved in the
investigation and in the pursuit of sanctions against BALCO-implicated

366. Id. at 942; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
367. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
368. Id. at 624.
369. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
370. For instance, sprinter Kelli White accepted sanctions after USADA presented her with
material it obtained from the BALCO investigation. See Mark Zeigler, Drugs Cost Montgomery
Sprint Mark, 2-Year Ban, SIGNSONSANDIEGO.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, http://signsonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20051214/news-1s1/trakdrug.html. As a result White agreed to testify against sprinter
Tim Montgomery, who sought to challenge USADA’s sanctions in the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS). Id. The CAS ruled, based in part on this testimony and the BALCO documents, to
uphold USADA’s determination that Montgomery engaged in doping. Id.
371. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 54 (1999).
372. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 559 (1987).
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athletes.373 It is precisely this type of “concerted effort”374 that can support a
finding of state action.
IV. CONCLUSION
While USADA is not a government entity, neither is it a typical private
corporation. USADA was created by Congress and ONDCP to serve
important government objectives both domestically and internationally.
USADA is heavily subsidized by the government, and it operates with the
government’s “imprimatur.” The federal government, through its involvement
with WADA, has important influence over USADA’s testing and sanctions
policies. Yet it is clear that despite the government’s substantial involvement
with USADA, in the usual case, USADA’s actions would not be fairly
attributable to the state. The federal government generally has no interest or
involvement in the typical doping case handled by USADA. In addition, the
federal government has no day-to-day control over USADA. However,
because of its close relationship with the federal government, USADA is
vulnerable to the type of government involvement with and influence over its
actions that could support a finding of state action. In unique situations, such
as that which took place in the months leading up to the Athens Olympic
Games in 2004, a strong argument can be made that USADA’s actions are
fairly attributable to the state.

373. The government remains involved in USADA’s efforts in this regard. Terry Madden,
USADA’s Chief Executive Officer, recently testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation that “we continue to work with the Department of Justice and the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of California in the ongoing investigation into the
BALCO doping conspiracy.” S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Terry Madden).
374. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (citing Shelly v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948)) (state action may be found where “the injury caused is
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority”).

